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In Intention, G.E.M. Anscombe sets out to examine the standard ways in which we use 
the word “intention”.  To this end, she also examines desire and how desires play a role in our 
intentions.  In the process, she divides desire into two distinct categories, those of weak and 
strong wanting.  This distinction is quite different from ancient and modern views of desire, 
which are briefly discussed as a means of comparing Anscombe’s view to her predecessors.  
After she has made this distinction, Anscombe tries to establish what is required of this new 
category of strong wanting.  These requirements include knowledge of the existence of the thing, 
movement towards it, and so forth.  This thesis then seeks to examine whether Anscombe’s view 
is either well-developed or convincing.  Through examination of Anscombe’s requirements of 
desirability characterization and utilization of practical reasoning, the conclusion appears to be 
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 In G.E.M. Anscombe’s groundbreaking work, Intention, Anscombe sets out to examine 
the standard uses of the word “intention” and the difficulties which arise from the varied and 
sometimes contradictory ways in which we utilize it.  In the process, Anscombe develops a 
unique view of desire, which will be the focus of this work.  In exploring this topic, I hope to 
show how Anscombe has modified the views of her predecessors as well as argue that her 
position has serious defects. 
 Chapter One of this thesis will provide a broad overview of the Platonic and Aristotelian 
views of desire as well as a fairly standard modern view of desire and an action-based view.  
These views, which are quite distinct from one another, will assist in giving a rubric by which to 
measure and compare Anscombe’s view.  Further, they will allow us to see which, if any, of 
Anscombe’s modifications are adequately defended as potential successors to their forbearers.   
 Chapter Two will examine Anscombe’s view of desire in detail.  It will begin with her 
modification of the standard use of desire and wanting and follow with what she believes is a 
coherent system which makes use of that modification.  Next, it will examine the ideas of 
desirability characterizations and practical reasoning Anscombe employs in defending her view.  
Along the way, potential difficulties for Anscombe’s view will be indicated, and they will be 





Chapter Three of this thesis will attempt to show where the shortcomings in Anscombe’s system 
are located, as well as to determine if any of these are fatal to her view.  The most significant of 
these criticisms will center on her unusual use of the words “want” and “desire” as well as 
examining the consequences for her vagueness in explaining what qualifies as moving toward a 
want and what makes a desire intelligible.  It is my hope that it will become clear that 
Anscombe’s view, while potentially promising, is neither thoroughly developed nor cohesive 






ANCIENT AND MODERN THEORIES OF DESIRE 
Theories regarding the nature of desire have been around since the ancient philosophers, 
and we continue to grapple with explaining desire in a way which makes it intelligible.  These 
theories have ranged from viewing desires as mental states which may or may not influence 
action to believing different parts of the soul correspond to different types of desires.  While each 
position is distinct and often quite different from both its predecessors and successors, it is 
helpful to take note of the progression from one to the next.  By evaluating older views of desire 
to determine what they seem to get right and trying to locate their deficiencies, we will be better 
able to see why new theories, such as Anscombe’s view of desire, come about and whether or 
not they adequately explain desire.  In this section I will discuss the Platonic and Aristotelian 
conceptions of desire as well as the modern standard view and the action-based view of desire to 
show the relevant features of the theories which helped shaped Anscombe’s view of desire. 
1.  The Platonic View of Desire 
 Plato presented an early view of desire which linked different desires to different parts of 
the soul, which allowed him to account for conflicting desires as well as for cases in which 
people acted on desires which were not in their best interest.  Plato asserted that people often 
have conflicting desires, and conflicting desires imply different types of desires.  Rational 




originate in the appetitive part of the soul.  Terence Irwin presents the example of a person who 
desires an alcoholic beverage because he is thirsty while at the same time he desires not to drink 
because he recognizes that drinking such a beverage would make him unfit to drive (Irwin, 286).  
Under Plato’s view of desire, the appetitive part of the soul is responsible for the non-rational 
desire to drink, and the rational part of the soul is the source of the rational desire not to drink.  
This distinction is due to the fact that rational desires can be influenced by reason and can 
change based on what one determines is best for oneself.  Non-rational desires, those from the 
appetitive part of the soul, do not conform to reason and simply express what the desirer has an 
inclination for regardless of the goodness or virtue in the desire (Irwin, 286-87). 
 Two important facets of Plato’s view which will be examined and followed through later 
views and also into Anscombe’s view of desire are the roles both action and goodness play in 
desire.  In the Meno, Socrates speaks of desires as desiring to get something, and Plato seems 
content with such a description.  Such a description seems quite similar to the common use of 
desire as wanting something one does not have, and, as in the common usage, it does not require 
action toward the desire.  Plato next addresses what is required of a desire in the Protagoras, in 
which Socrates argues that people only desire things which are either good or have the illusion of 
goodness (Irwin, 284-85).  Under this view, when we act on desires for bad things rather than 
good ones, Irwin explains, “such actions simply result from ignorance about the comparative 
benefits.  Since the short-term benefit of y will happen sooner than the long-term benefit of x, we 
mistakenly infer that y must be better than x, and so we choose y.  Once we correct this error, we 
will choose x instead” (Irwin, 283-84).  However, Irwin believes Plato rejects this view 
presented by Socrates, and instead Plato adopts the position that people who act on non-rational 




good.  However, because non-rational desires are not subject to logical reasoning, one can 
continue to hold and even act on his non-rational desires while simultaneously knowing that 
acting on those desires is not in his best interest (Irwin, 287).  If these are both the case, Plato’s 
view of desire simply seems to be that desires, which only indicate that one has an inclination 
toward some thing or state of affairs, conflict because they originate from different parts of the 
soul.  When a person acts on a desire which is non-rational, or contrary to what is good for him, 
the person is not necessarily acting out of ignorance of the good but rather in defiance of what is 
good.   
2.  The Aristotelian View of Desire 
 Aristotle draws heavily on Plato’s view of desire while also rejecting Plato’s conclusion 
that people often act on non-rational desires while realizing that doing so is not in their best 
interest.  Aristotle accepts Plato’s distinction between rational and non-rational desires which 
emanate from different parts of the soul, and, “he agrees with Plato in believing that non-rational 
desires are necessary for incontinence; for they cause the incontinent person’s ignorance” (Irwin, 
296).  However, Aristotle rejects Plato’s view that people can act on non-rational desires while 
knowing that they are bad for themselves.  Rather, Aristotle presents a more complex view in 
which there are virtuous and vicious people as well as continent and incontinent people.  While 
the actions of each may overlap, there is a vast difference in how each of them reasons about 
desire and the role of desire in their subsequent behavior.   
Aristotle’s paragon of human action is the virtuous person whose character is such that he 
only desires good or appropriate ends.  The virtuous person is constituted in such a way that his 




wrong sort of ends.  Furthermore, the virtuous person’s deliberation always produces behavior 
which allows him to act on his virtue-producing desires.  From this it follows that the virtuous 
person is neither able to desire the wrong sorts of things nor to act in a way which is not in 
accordance with virtue.  As Irwin states, “the correct account of virtue must make it clear that the 
virtuous person’s non-rational desires are not merely subordinate to and controlled by rational 
desires.  They must also be in harmony with rational desires.  Such harmony does not result from 
merely cognitive training.  It must involve both rational understanding and the appropriate 
training of one’s emotions” (Irwin, 290).   
Aristotle’s completely vicious person is the opposite of a completely virtuous person in 
that the vicious person desires only the wrong sort of things which do not lead to virtuous ends.  
Rather, the vicious person is constituted in such a way that his desires run contrary to desires 
which produce virtue.  Furthermore, the vicious person’s reasoning faculties function in such a 
way that he believes acting on his vicious desires is the reasonable course of action.  While the 
vicious person’s desires cannot produce virtue, the vicious person is satisfied with his desires and 
the resulting poor ends.   
Aristotle next presents the continent individual as one who may have non-virtuous desires 
but who can adequately control his behavior and thus act in a way which appears to be virtuous.  
Such a person can have desires for ends which would be similar to those desired by the vicious 
person, but the continent person has been sufficiently morally developed to recognize that those 
desires would not produce good ends.  The continent person is then able to adjust his behavior to 
correspond with the actions of the virtuous person.  However, the difference between the merely 
continent person and the truly virtuous person is that the virtuous person only desires virtuous 




adequately enough to present the illusion of acting in accordance with virtue.  Due to the 
disunion between the desires and actions of the continent person, this person’s soul is not 
harmonious, despite the fact that he can engage in the right actions.   
Aristotle’s final characterization is that of the incontinent person, one who seems to grasp 
the concept of acting on the good but whose behavior does not mirror this knowledge.  Aristotle 
claims in the Nicomachean Ethics that the distinction between the incontinent person and the 
continent one is that, “the incontinent person knows that his actions are base, but does them 
because of the way he is affected; the continent person knows that his appetites are base, but 
because of reason does not follow them…” (qtd in Irwin 296).  As such, an incontinent person 
may be mistaken about his situation or about the applicability of virtuous action regarding his 
specific desires and thus he acts contrary to virtuous action.  Aristotle presents such a case as 
follows: 
If, for instance, everything sweet must be tasted, and this- some one particular 
thing- is sweet, it is necessary for someone who is able and unhindered also to act 
on this at the same time.  Suppose, then, that someone has the universal belief 
hindering him from tasting; he has the second belief, that everything sweet is 
pleasant and this is sweet, and this belief is active; he also has appetite. Hence the 
belief tells him to avoid this, but appetite leads him on, since it is capable of 
moving each of the <bodily> parts.  The result, then, is that in a way reason and 
belief make him act incontinently.  The belief is contrary to correct reason, but 
only coincidentally, not in itself.  For it is the appetite, not the belief, that is 
contrary… And since the last premiss is a belief about something perceptible, and 
controls action, this must be what the incontinent person lacks when he is being 
affected.  Or <rather> the way he has it is not knowledge of it, but, as we saw, 
saying the words, as the drunk says the words of Empedocles. (qtd in Irwin 207) 
In cases such as these, the incontinent person seems to know what the right action is, but that 
knowledge has not been made a part of his soul in such a way that it can control his actions.  




have the force to motivate action, and the incontinent person’s faculties present false premises 
about what would be the correct action regarding his beliefs. 
If we accept this interpretation of Aristotle’s view, it would appear that only perfectly 
virtuous individuals would always act toward the good in the correct way as their rational and 
non-rational desires would always be in harmony.  Non-virtous people, whether incontinent, 
continent, or vicious, would be subject to both rational and non-rational desires.  There would be 
times when they act incorrectly, whether due to their ignorance of the good regarding their 
desires in certain situations or from not even having the correct desires.   
While Aristotle speaks of rational and non-rational desires influencing one’s action, he 
doesn’t seem to hold any position which requires desire to entail action.  It appears entirely 
coherent, under the Aristotelian view of desire, for one to have a multitude of rational and non-
rational desires which one does not take any action toward fulfilling.  Rather, for the virtuous 
person, desires would be indicative of things which the virtuous person wants to have or make 
happen, which, by the nature of a virtuous person, would be good-producing states or objects.  
For the non-virtuous person, desires may or may not align with goodness based on which part of 
the soul generates the desires.  For either type of person, the motivation to act would be the result 
of deliberating on his desires, with the resulting outcome being dependent on which person we 
are speaking of.  In the case of the virtuous person, there would surely be many things which he 
could desire but which could not all be acted on simply due to the fact that one cannot act on all 
of one’s desires even when the desires are good and the desirer is virtuous.  Rather, it would 
seem, the virtuous person would deliberate about which of the desires would produce the most 




3.  The Modern View of Desire 
From the Platonic and Aristotelian views of desire, as well as many formulations which 
came after, there has come to be a somewhat standard view of desire which is held by many 
modern philosophers who study desire.  Under this rather vague view, having a desire for 
something is simply a matter of having a certain type of dispositions, and these dispositions are 
the only necessary feature of the desire state of mind.  Timothy Schroeder somewhat clarifies the 
view by saying, “a desire is just anything that plays the functional role characteristic of desires, 
which is that of tending to bring about the state of affairs which is the object of the desire… 
Wants, plans, intentions, acts of will, cravings, goals, and more are all types of desires” 
(Schroeder, 3-4).   
Under this modern standard view, having a desire requires nothing of the person 
experiencing the desire.  If one has a desire for a sandwich, it may be the case that one acts in 
such a way as to get oneself a sandwich.  However, it is equally possible that one simply thinks 
about having a sandwich, wishes he had a sandwich, and so forth.  For one to have a desire, one 
is not required to act on his desire in any way or intend to fulfill his desire. Further, desires are 
generally not divided into any type of subcategories because doing so would not garner any 
additional information.  Calling a desire a wish rather than a craving or a want does not make it 
more or less likely to be acted on or more or less good, so these distinctions are rather 
meaningless under such a view of desire.  Because the standard view of desire is so broad, it can 
be easily modified to fit almost any theory of desire, from action based theories to virtue based 
ones.  Such modifications can simply alter what would count as an object of desire or, in the case 




4.  The Action-Based View of Desire 
Within the class of modern, standard views, there is a modified theory that emphasizes 
action.  I will call this theory the action-based view of desire.  In the action-based view of desire, 
desire and belief combine to make one inclined to action.  Under this system, when a person has 
a desire for something and a belief that X action would help him achieve his desire, he is inclined 
to act in X way.  However, such a distinction may, in practice, not change the outcome of the 
desire.  Wanting anything or any state of affairs would still qualify as a desire, but being inclined 
to act does not require one to actually do anything.  One can be disposed to do any number of 
contradictory things without choosing to actually act on any of them due to things such as 
conflicting desires or the recognition that acting on the desire may not be the most prudent 
course of action.   
Despite these potentially minimal changes in the outcome of desires, the action-based 
view is distinct from the standard view because it does identify the propensity to act, rather than 
simply the inclination to behave in certain ways (thinking about the object of the desire and so 
on), as the general outcome in the belief-desire model.  Nevertheless, despite these differences, 
there are some similarities; like the standard view, this action based view puts no additional 
stipulations on what qualifies as a desire, with the result that wishes, wants, and so forth would 
continue to fall under the heading of desire.  Additionally, the action-based view does not require 
an inherent view of goodness as a requirement for desire.  As we shall see shortly, such views 
can be integrated into the action-based view of desire, but they are not necessary for a basic 




The possible positions to utilize for examining desire are clearly quite broad, and even 
those which seem to differ significantly from one another have commonalities which can help us 
make sense of desire.  Where Plato and Aristotle viewed conflicting desires as arising from 
different parts of the soul, modern philosophers have taken to viewing them as mental states 
which can still produce conflicting desires.  However, the ideas of incontinence when acting on 
desires which the ancients put forth will continue to be helpful as we next examine an action-
based view of desire which also incorporates a view of goodness.  We may also find that while 
modern philosophers may not speak of parts of the soul motivating different types of desires, the 
qualities such as appetite and reason which the ancients believed motivated desire may still be 





ANSCOMBE’S VIEW OF DESIRE 
 In Chapter Two, my goal is to present G.E.M. Anscombe’s view of desire, including her 
differentiation between types of wanting and the conditions she sets for them.  As I hope to 
demonstrate, Anscombe’s view is rather different from preceding views of desire, and she uses 
ideas of wanting and desire in ways which are somewhat contrary to both the philosophical and 
common uses of them.  This position divides wanting into two classes, and Anscombe presents 
the latter class as being far removed from what we normally mean when we use the words 
“want” or “desire”.  I will thoroughly examine Anscombe’s view in Part II and present several 
potential difficulties which may arise from it in the subsequent section.   
1.  Intention 
 In one of her best known works, Intention, Anscombe sets out to examine the multiple 
ways in which we use the word “intention” and determine if it is appropriately used in each of 
those ways.  Anscombe begins by presenting what she sees as the three primary views of 
intention.  The first is the expression of the future intention to do a certain action, such as, “I am 
going to (or I intend to) go for a walk.” The second is expressing intention as an intentional 
action, such as, “I intentionally put on my shoes.” The third is intention as a means of describing 
with what intention an action was done, as when I say, “I went for a walk because I intend to get 




there is no common thread through these different types of use of the word intention.  We cannot 
say, for example, that the word intention always applies to future states or that it always acts as a 
prediction of some desired outcome. For example, while the first type of intention does express 
what a person intends to do in the future, the second and third type could refer to either an action 
one has already done or to some future action.  This lack of coherence in our use of the word 
“intention” is troubling to Anscombe because we can, and often do, speak of our own intentions 
or the intentions of others when we are actually, as Anscombe says, “pretty much in the dark 
about the character of the concept which it represents” (Anscombe, 1).  Thus, Anscombe’s goal 
becomes to examine the ways in which we use the word ”intention” and develop a more cohesive 
view of how we ought to appropriately speak of intention.   
2.  Desire 
 One plausible candidate for what these different types of intention have in common is the 
notion of desire.  As Anscombe describes the use of intention in explaining the goal (or 
intention) of one’s action, she introduces the questions, “What do you want?” and “With a view 
to what are you doing X,Y, and Z?” (Anscombe, 63).  While these are seemingly very simple 
questions, they introduce the complicated notion of desire into Anscombe’s view of intention.  
From these questions it would appear that one’s intention in acting in whatever way being 
referred to in the relevant scenario is the satisfaction of whichever one of his desires he would 
present as his answer to, “What do you want?”  Anscombe claims that genearlly, “we do not 
make much distinction between one sort of desire and another, and we should say: isn’t it desire 
in some sense- i.e. wanting- that prompts the action in all the cases?” (Anscombe,62).  However, 
this basic view of desire which Anscombe claims we generally use is greatly at odds with the 




 While Anscombe believes most people are amenable to viewing all desires as generally 
equivalent, she quickly comes to establish certain types of wanting as distinct from other types, 
and possibly from the typical view of desire altogether.  Anscombe again presents what she 
believes is a common view of wanting in which people can want anything at all; according to 
this view, wanting could even include such desires as idle wishes.  This view appears to be the 
view held under the ancient views of desire was well as the modern standard and action-based 
views.  She rejects this view because, “the chief mark of an idle wish is that a man does nothing- 
whether he could or no- towards the fulfillment of the wish” (Anscombe, 67).  While she doesn’t 
dispute that people can desire these things, she does not regard them as equivalent to all kinds of 
wanting because some wants, under the view she is setting forth, prompt action, and these wishes 
do not.  
Anscombe’s view gets even more complicated when she makes the claim that, “wanting 
may of course be applied to the prick of desire at the thought or sight of an object, even though a 
man then does nothing towards getting the object… The more the thing is envisaged as a 
likelihood, the more wishing turns into wanting… But, wanting, in the sense of the prick of 
desire, is compatible with one’s doing nothing at all towards getting what one wants, even 
though one could do something” (Anscombe, 67).  The difference between this sort of want and 
mere wishing is apparently only in the duration or vivacity of our desires for the wanted thing, 
and neither wishes nor these types of wants motivate one to do anything to achieve the object of 
desire.   
Anscombe will treat this category of wants, what I will call weak wants, as being of the 
same type as wishing, hoping, and so on.  As such, any further discussion of weak wanting will 




of weak wanting, so she devotes very little time to discussing what such wanting would entail.  
However, it initially seems as though these weak wants would be any desires which one does not 
act on.  Anscombe also provides no explanation for why one does not act on these desires.  We 
could speculate that, perhaps, the desirer does not see the desires as good, attainable, or so forth, 
but Anscombe is not forthcoming with her own explanation for this.  As we will see shortly, 
strong wanting requires some sort of belief regarding the existence of the wanted thing, but 
Anscombe makes no claims regarding the existence of weak wants.  It would appear that the 
objects of weak wants could exist, but this existence is not required, and the desirer would not be 
required to have knowledge of its existence or its absence.  Anscombe’s lack of discussion 
regarding weak wants is somewhat frustrating because we are left unsure of why the distinction 
between weak and strong wanting is necessary, as well as what, exactly, are the distinguishing 
factors between the two.   
3.  Strong Wanting 
After Anscombe establishes the category of weak wants, she puts forward another type of 
wants, what I will call strong wants, which are quite different from the standard view of both 
wanting and desire.  Anscombe describes this strong wanting as, “neither wishing nor hoping nor 
the feeling of desire, and [it] cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting 
what he wants” (Anscombe, 67-8).  Further, “The primitive sign of wanting is trying to get… 
Thus there are two features present in wanting; movement towards a thing and knowledge (or at 
least opinion) that the thing is there” (Anscombe, 68).   
Notice that there are two new elements here.  First, there is now a requirement for 




wanting requires movement toward the wanted object.  This is far more stringent than the 
standard action-based view of desire, which claims desire simply makes one disposed to take the 
actions he believes will help him fulfill his desire.  However, where the action-based view 
actually requires no action from the desirer, only the inclination toward action when desire and 
belief combine, the strong wanting view requires some sort of vague “movement towards” the 
object of wanting.  
 Anscombe’s stipulation that strong wanting requires not only movement toward the 
wanted thing but also knowledge, or opinion, that the thing exists also needs to be explored in 
greater detail due to Anscombe’s vagueness of what exactly this requirement entails.  It seems 
apparent that knowledge of the existence of the object of the strong want would be ideal.  
However, Anscombe appears to recognize that actual knowledge, with whatever criteria that 
would entail, is not always possible.  To remedy this, she allows for one to simply be of the 
opinion that such a thing exists.   
The problem with this is, quite simply, that one can be of the opinion that anything exists, 
whether that opinion is justified or not.  For example, I could be of the opinion when the doorbell 
rings that a delivery man will be there with a package I am expecting because I was told to 
expect it on that certain date.  When I go to the door to open it, it will be with the opinion that I 
am doing so to get my package from the delivery man outside my door.  However, it is entirely 
possible that my opinion is incorrect, and, in going to the door, I will actually be opening it to a 
traveling salesman intent on selling me a vacuum cleaner I am not interested in purchasing.  
Clearly my opinion regarding who would be on the other side of the door would be mistaken, 




Anscombe also allows for wanting some future state of affairs or object by saying that in 
such a case one would somehow be moving towards the idea of the thing or state of affairs, 
rather than towards the thing itself.  In these situations, one would apparently have the notion of 
something he wants in the future, and the idea of this thing and the possibility of its future 
existence takes the place of knowledge of its present existence.  In cases such as the delivery 
man, I may have the idea of a delivery man who will be bringing my package later in the day, but 
I will only have a general idea of him until I open my door and see him.  When I am moving 
toward my desire to get my package from the deliveryman outside my door, I will actually be 
moving toward the idea of him, and, as we have seen, my opinion that he is there will have been 
incorrect.  While these modifications are apparently added to make the strong wanting view 
applicable to a wider variety of situations and their corresponding wants, they simultaneously 
appear to make the object of a strong want far more vague:  nearly anything could be the object 
of a strong want provided that the person wanting it is operating under the belief that the thing 
exists, whether that belief is justified or not. 
4.  Desirability Characterizations 
In addition to the knowledge and movement requirements Anscombe places on strong 
wanting, she also specifies what sort of things one can want, or, more specifically, what one 
would have to do to accurately call something a want of this sort.  Anscombe again 
acknowledges that some philosophers hold a view of desire in which a person can desire 
anything at all, and such a view would not require any explanation from the desirer regarding 
what they see as desirable in the object of their desire.  However, Anscombe soundly rejects this 
view, and she instead presents a much more comprehensive view of what can actually be 




anything at all, his want is only coherent as a strong want if he can also provide what Anscombe 
calls a desirability characterization.  Such a characterization must provide an answer to the 
questions, “Why do you want it?” or, “For what do you want it?”  For Anscombe’s conception of 
strong wanting, “To say, ‘I merely want this’ without any characterisation is to deprive the word 
of sense” (Anscombe, 71).  
However, this requirement calls into question Anscombe’s claim that strong wants are 
distinct from feelings of desire.  If this were the case, it would be nonsense to require someone to 
explain what he saw as desirable in an object if he actually did not have a feeling of desire 
toward it.  While it has generally been accepted in both the ancient and modern views that 
wanting is a subset of desire, Anscombe instead puts wanting in a class distinct from general 
desire.  Moran and Stone claim that under this view Anscombe thinks of strong wanting, “as 
what we conclude when we deliberate on what to do-‘that is what I want to do’-which may not 
be something we desire or find pleasant” (Moran and Stone, 29).  However, if we accept Moran 
and Stone’s interpretation, we may want something which we do not desire.  This is troublesome 
as it is peculiar, at least under our ordinary use of “want” and “desire”, to say, “I want X, but I do 
not desire it.”  The first problem which arises here is that there doesn’t appear to be a way to 
speak of wanting something without using either the word “desire” or the ideas we associate with 
it, but this problem will be more thoroughly addressed in Part Three. The second problem which 
arises is that Anscombe wants wanting to be distinct from desire, but she still requires that we 
should be able to explain what we see as desirable in the object of our want 
 If we accept Anscombe’s requirement of a desirability characterization, we must 
examine what information she would find suitable for such a characterization.  Such a 




desire comprehensible to others.  Anscombe presents a quite famous example of such a 
characterization which makes the idea of a desirability characterization more clear.  In the 
example, we are to imagine that a group of Nazis is aware of their impending death, and they 
decide to spend their last hour devising a way to kill a group of Jewish children.  When asked 
why they are doing such a thing, the Nazis would say it befits a Nazi who is about to die to kill 
as many Jewish children as possible.  While most people would find the actions of the Nazis 
abhorrent, those people could still, according to Anscombe, understand the appeal to duty which 
motivated the Nazis actions.  Conversely, if someone claims to want something innocuous, such 
as a pin, but the only explanation she can provide when asked why she wants it is, “For 
pleasure,” we cannot reasonably call her desire a strong want because it is not apparent what 
pleasure one would get from simply possessing a pin.  We could press her on her desire and 
perhaps she would tell us she enjoys collecting different types of pins and she gets pleasure out 
of examining their differences.  If this were the case, we could perhaps understand her desire for 
the pin, even if we have never had the desire to collect pins ourselves.   
However, we must consider how Anscombe would respond to the woman if she 
maintains that she only wants the pin for the pleasure of it.  If this is the only answer the woman 
can give us, Anscombe would require us to say that the woman only thinks she wants the pin, but 
that she is actually mistaken and such a desire is not a strong want.  Without a desirability 
characterization, strong wanting cannot occur because there is not a sufficient answer to the why 
question.  Anscombe is comfortable with this conclusion, but accepting it does seem to put us in 
the position of sometimes telling people that they don’t really want what they believe they want.  
This concern will be further discussed in Chapter Three, but Anscombe is rather unsympathetic 




An additional concern which can arise when a desirability characterization is required for 
any object or state of affairs one wants is that, it would seem, for such characterizations to be 
coherent, we must have some idea of goodness which is generally shared between all people.  As 
Talbot Brewer explains, “When we attempt to bring agency into view, we must assume a partial 
community of shared or at least mutually intelligible values.  Put another way, we must draw 
upon a substantive rather than a merely formal conception of practical rationality” (Brewer, 27).  
Anscombe dismisses this notion because, for her, “the notion of ‘good’ that has to be introduced 
in an account of wanting is not that of what is really good but of what the agent conceives to be 
good; what the agent wants would have to be characterisable as good by him” (Anscombe, 76).  
Whether this response is sufficient will be determined shortly, but Anscombe seems confident 
that such an objection is well refuted by her position.   
 Besides claiming that strong wanting includes an end which can be characterized as good, 
Anscombe also believes that strong wanting involves practical reasoning.  She believes practical 
reasoning must be utilized because, under her conception of strong wanting, this type of wanting 
requires movement towards the wanted object or state of affairs, and practical reasoning gives 
one reasons to act in this way rather than that way. However, she is quite clear that, “the role of 
‘wanting’ in the practical syllogism is quite different from that of a premise.  It is that whatever 
is described in the proposition that is the starting-point of the argument must be wanted in order 
for the reasoning to lead to any action” (Anscombe, 66).  If this is the case, one would start with 
a certain want and practical reasoning would explain how one should act on that want. 
Anscombe’s common example of practical reasoning begins with the desire for a cow.  
This desire starts the practical reasoning process, but it is not a premise.  Rather, the 




draw from this would be, “So, I will go to the market.”  Thus, because someone already has a 
desire for a cow, and practical reasoning has demonstrated that he could get a cow from the 
market, he concludes that he will go to the market.   
5.  Contrasting Anscombe’s View of Practical Reasoning With the Ancient and Modern Views 
As previously stated, practical reasoning is essential to Anscombe’s view because her 
conception of strong wanting requires moving towards the wanted thing, and, as she presents it, 
practical reasoning would lead to such a conclusion.  If we follow the progression Anscombe sets 
forth, when we begin with a strong want we have some object or state of affairs which we want 
to attain.  If it is, in fact, a strong want, we should also be able to produce a desirability 
characterization for the wanted thing to make our wanting of it intelligible.  If we are able to do 
this, our want has also initiated practical reasoning.  Through practical reasoning we would 
present reasons for our action, with the conclusion being the action we have desired to do. 
Anscombe seems to believe that if someone begins with his want for something and utilizes 
practical reasoning to show what actions one should take to satisfy his desire, movement towards 
the want would be the natural conclusion. In these situations, a desirability characterization 
shows what someone sees as good in his desire and practical reasoning demonstrates the action 
he should take to satisfy that desire.   
It should be noted that the view of practical reasoning Anscombe presents is quite 
different from the standard view of practical reasoning.  Maria Alvarez presents the standard 
view of practical reasoning, which she views as incorrect, as one in which, “I want to X,” is the 




to X-ing,” and the conclusion indicating, “So, I should Y” (Alvarez, 359).  This view of practical 
reasoning seems applicable in both the ancient and action-based views of desire.   
However, Alvarez agrees with Anscombe that this view of practical reasoning is not 
accurate and that the object of one’s wanting should not be included as a premise in practical 
reasoning because wanting to do something is not, or at least should not be, included as a reason 
for doing it.  However, the truth of this is not entirely apparent.  While one’s desire to do 
something should, perhaps, not be one’s only reason for doing it, it does seem plausible that 
one’s desire could be a contributing reason for doing it.  
To support both her own view and Anscombe’s rejecting desire as a premise for practical 
reasoning, Alvarez presents Aristotle’s view of practical syllogisms as means-end reasoning, in 
which one uses reasoning to determine means which would help him attain what he desires.  If 
this is the case, a premise in which one puts forth his desire is not conducive to helping one 
achieve his desire (Alvarez, 364).  However, as Anscombe says, practical reasoning will only 
terminate in action when someone begins the reasoning with the desire for something and then 
presents premises for how to achieve their desire.  So, while a want is a starting place of sorts, it 
is not an actual premise.  As such, reasoning of the same form can be done by anyone, even 
someone without the particular want, but that reasoning would only lead to the conclusion that, if 
he were to want that certain object or state of affairs, he should act in the way indicated by his 
practical reasoning (Anscombe, 66).  The conclusion reached by one who does not hold the 
certain desire seems more in line with the one someone who engages in Aristotle’s view of 
practical reasoning would reach.  Anscombe presents what she believes the conclusion of 
Aristotelian practical reasoning to be generally of the type, “What’s here is good for me,” or “I 




reasoning.  Rather, Anscombe’s conclusion is not that I should do X thing, but that I will do X 
thing.  Thus, Anscombe believes the conclusion of practical reasoning is an action, not a should 
or ought statement, as Aristotle seems to indicate.  This difference between these conclusions 
seems to create a sort of bridge between the Aristotelian view and the action-based view in that 
Anscombe is utilizing Aristotelian style practical reasoning, but she believes her variety of 
practical reasoning results in action as a conclusion.    
In Chapter Three, I will examine several criticisms of Anscombe’s view as well as their 
defenses.  With this discussion, some of Anscombe’s views may become clearer to the reader, 
particularly the idea of wanting independent of desire.  Furthermore, the notions of desirability 
characterization and practical reasoning will be examined in more detail, and the potential 






DIFFICULTIES FOR ANSCOMBE’S THEORY OF DESIRE 
As we have seen, Anscombe presents a view of wanting in which there are weak wants, 
wishes, hopes, and so forth, which do not require any action, and strong wants, which require 
both knowledge or at least opinion that the wanted thing exists and movement on the part of the 
desirer toward the wanted thing.  This view also requires that strong wants are able to be made 
intelligible to others and that one utilizes practical reasoning to motivate action toward his strong 
want.   
In this part of my thesis, I will argue that this view radically modifies both ancient and 
modern views of desire in potentially problematic ways, and that there are several difficulties 
Anscombe neglects to resolve with her conception of wanting.  These potential problems include 
her vague and uncustomary use of the words desire and wanting as well as her failure to specify 
what is required when we say one must be moving toward the object of his desire for it to qualify 
as a strong want.  I will also examine what the implications are for Anscombe’s system given the 
breadth of what may qualify as the object of a strong want under the qualifications she provides.  
Finally, I will discuss the problems we must address when implementing Anscombe’s 
requirements for desirability characterizations and practical reasoning for strong wants.  At the 
minimum, these concerns seem to merit further discussion of what Anscombe’s intentions are 
with her qualifications for strong wanting.  However, some of the difficulties are so troublesome 




1.  The Distinction Between Weak and Strong Wanting 
We have seen that Anscombe makes a distinction between weak wanting, which includes 
desires such as wishes and hopes, and strong wanting, which has far more stringent 
qualifications.  The only requirement for weak wanting is that one has any sort of desire, of any 
strength, for a thing or state of affairs.  Strong Wanting requires, at the minimum, both 
knowledge, or opinion, that the wanted thing exists, and movement toward the thing or state of 
affairs.  Anscombe also requires that a desirability characterization be provided to indicate what 
one sees as the good in the object of their strong want, as well as the utilization of practical 
reasoning to indicate a means to achieving the strong want.   
The first difficulty for Anscombe arises when we consider what she means by her view of 
strong wanting and why this modified view of desire is necessary. This is not a division which is 
present in either of the ancient views I have discussed or in the standard or action-based views, 
so it would have been helpful for Anscombe to be more forthcoming in explaining why such a 
distinction is necessary.  When she divides wanting into strong and weak forms, she claims that 
she is only interested in strong wanting which is, “neither wishing nor hoping nor the feeling of 
desire, and cannot be said to exist in a man who does nothing towards getting what he wants” 
(Anscombe, 68).  However, the distinctions she makes in types of wanting and the way she uses 
both wanting and desire seems questionable and presents multiple difficulties for her view.   
The problem with this distinction is that, both in philosophy and in everyday use, the 
notions of wanting and desire are typically used in reference to one another.  To desire 
something is to want to have the desired thing or to want to make a certain state of affairs obtain.  




certainly speak of different strengths of desires or wanting some things more and other things 
less, making strong wanting something distinct from desire and its categories of wishing, hoping, 
and so forth seems to require a nonsensical definition of wanting which would require us to say 
something like, “To want is to want to have,” which clearly gives us no indication of why 
wanting is distinct from what we usually mean by desire.  Rather, under Anscombe’s view, 
desire seems to be a subset of wanting instead of wanting being a type of desire. 
This distinction seems particularly odd since, on Anscombe’s view, wanting seems to 
encompass belief and action, despite the fact that Anscombe gives us no reason why we should 
treat strong wanting as anything but a mental state on the same level as we typically describe 
desire.  For Anscombe’s view that strong wanting is distinct from standard desire to be coherent, 
Anscombe needs to present a more convincing explanation of why it makes sense to treat strong 
wanting as necessarily motivating action despite the fact that neither desire nor wanting typically 
have that connotation.   
2.  What Does “Moving Towards” Require? 
A crucial facet of Anscombe’s view of strong wanting is that “the primitive sign of 
wanting is trying to get” (Anscombe, 68).  Because Anscombe is concerned with investigating 
action, and particularly intentional action, her interest in the types of desire which motivate 
action is reasonable. As I have discussed, Anscombe’s view of wanting is quite a modification of 
our standard use of the word wanting, and claiming that wanting requires trying to get appears to 
mean that Anscombe needs this to be a sign of wanting for her view to make sense.  Anscombe 
makes this claim as though wanting always requires trying to get, but standard views of wanting 




standard views of desire, and it is more forceful than the action-based view under which desire 
may simply motivate trying to get. 
The trouble with this requirement arises when we examine how it becomes the case that 
strong wanting requires action.  While strong wanting requires both this movement toward the 
wanted thing and knowledge or opinion that the thing exists, this movement towards the wanted 
thing seems to be the distinguishing feature between strong wanting and weak wanting as in both 
cases one can believe the wanted thing exists.  If this is the case, the strong want must include 
action, in the form of “moving towards”, before it can accurately be called a strong want.  
However, for one to be moving towards a want, it must be a strong want rather than any of the 
varieties of weak wants. Anscombe uses the notion of action to explain how strong wants differ 
from weak wants, but she then uses the notion of strong wants to explain action.  This is 
problematic because it is difficult to see if the action is caused by the want being a strong want or 
if the want becomes a strong want because an action has taken place.  
The second problem with Anscombe’s stipulation that strong wanting requires movement 
is that she never clarifies how the notion of “moving toward” is related to intentionality. As 
previously discussed in Chapter Two, strong wanting requires the one doing the wanting to 
utilize practical reasoning to provide reasons why acting on his want would be a good thing for 
him to do.  This reasoning begins with a desire to do X, and premises are presented for why 
doing X would be good for the desirer.  The conclusion for such reasoning should be something 
like, “I will do X,” which states the desirer’s intention to do X.  While this is quite 
straightforward, it is not apparent under Anscombe’s system that the intention to do X is 
adequate for one to be moving toward X.  Perhaps one could be said to be intending to move 




pure and, as such, would not influence one’s actions (Moran and Stone, 40).  Anscombe may, 
perhaps, consider intention some sort of mental action, such that intending would be something 
like planning, which could perhaps be a facet of moving one toward what he wants.  However, I 
am inclined to say intention is not adequate for moving towards one’s want because people so 
frequently have pure intentions, but Anscombe’s lack of clarity regarding what can be considered 
as moving toward a want raises this concern. 
3.  What Can Qualify as an Object of Strong Wanting? 
As previously discussed, for the object of a desire to qualify as a strong want, the person 
who wants it must either have knowledge of the thing’s existence, or be of the opinion that the 
thing exists.  Knowledge of its existence would clearly be ideal, but is not always possible given 
factors such as strong wanting for things which may not currently exist.  To compensate for this, 
Anscombe allows that one can be of the opinion that the thing exists and be moving toward it for 
it to be a strong want. 
However, a problem raised by Anscombe’s ambiguity regarding moving toward a want is 
whether it is meaningful to move toward something which doesn’t actually exist. This is 
potentially problematic because it applies both to things which may not exist at all as well as to 
things which one supposes will exist in the future.  Anscombe believes the problem of wanting 
non-existent objects can be settled in the following way: “wanting a cow need not involve a 
belief, ‘some cow is -‘; and still less does wanting a wife involve a belief ‘some wife of mine is  
–‘.  A similar difficulty can indeed arise for animals too: we say the cat is waiting for a mouse at 
a mousehole, but suppose there is no mouse? Here, however, it is reasonable enough to introduce 




Anscombe seems to think misguided belief in the existence of a thing or the possibility of future 
existence is adequate for opinion that the thing exists. 
However, allowing for misguided belief or belief in the possible existence of future 
existence is problematic for the notion of strong wanting because one can be of the opinion that 
absolutely anything exists.  As in the cat and mouse example, the mouse does not actually have 
to exist for the cat to want it, so one can clearly want things which one only believes to exist.  
Anscombe, however, does not simply think that the cat has a false belief, but, rather, she thinks 
that the cat is actually moving towards the object of its want- and this doesn’t seem to be the case 
at all.  It seems to be absolute nonsense to say a person, or cat, is moving towards a strong want 
when the wanted thing doesn’t actually exist as it is impossible to move toward a thing which 
isn’t there.  One can certainly believe they are moving toward the thing, but believing one is 
doing something is clearly not the same as actually doing it.   
Kieran Setiya recognizes this as a concern for Anscombe and presents as a possible 
substitute the condition that, “when an agent acts intentionally, there must be something he does 
intentionally (and does not merely try to do) in the belief that he is doing it” (Setiya, 344). 
According to Setiya, a person must actually be doing the action he is intending to do to achieve 
his strong want.  Such a condition does a better job accounting for cases such as the cat and 
mouse example in which one believes he is moving toward a want but, in fact, is not. 
Setiya’s argument also resolves a problem which may arise in which one wants to do X 
and is doing Y, which is a means to do X, but without the knowledge that Y will lead to X.  
Setiya presents an example he borrowed from Donald Davidson in which X intends to murder Y 




Y to death.  While X intended to kill Y, under Setiya’s view, X did not intentionally kill Y 
because X’s actions were not performed in the way X intended for them to be performed to kill 
Y (Setiya, 363).  While Anscombe’s view is ambiguous on whether or not such an action would 
be considered moving towards the object of the desire, Setiya’s distinction is an important one as 
it rules out cases in which one may unintentionally act in ways which would move one toward 
one’s strong desire. 
4.  Problems with Desirability Characterizations and Practical Reasoning 
 Anscombe’s view of strong wanting contains the requirement that the person who has the 
strong want must be able to present what Anscombe calls a desirability characterization if we are 
to call his want intelligible.  Such a characterization should provide an explanation of what 
someone sees as desirable in his want as well as answering why he wants the object of his strong 
want.  As the previously discussed Nazi example shows, Anscombe believes answers such as, “It 
befits a Nazi, if he must die, to spend his last hour exterminating Jews” (Anscombe, 72), are 
adequate because they appeal to things like a sense of duty which is recognizable as good even if 
the duty required is abhorrent.  Anscombe believes, “ the notion of ‘good’ that has to be 
introduced in an account of wanting is not that of what is really good but of what the agent 
conceives to be good; what the agent wants would have to be characterisable as good by him” 
(Anscombe, 76).   
If we accept Anscombe’s description of desirability as she presents it, her view doesn’t 
seem to require that the objective good of desires to be made intelligible to others; however, the 
failure to make objective good a requirement is a mistake.  In the Nazi case, for us to see the 




commitment to one’s duty as good for his desirability characterization to be intelligible to us.  
This would appear to be the case with any want at all as we cannot understand the motivation 
behind a desire if we are unable to see the motivating factor, be it pleasure, duty, etc. as good.  
The only conclusion that appears reasonable from this is that we must share some set of beliefs 
about what is inherently good for desirability characterizations to be sensible on this view, but 
Anscombe denies that such a conclusion is necessary.    
While someone could object that we could, perhaps, appreciate how the Nazi would see 
killing Jewish children as good given his worldview without seeing it as good ourselves, such an 
objection doesn’t seem terribly damaging to this criticism.  For us to appreciate how a Nazi 
could see such an action as good, we would need to know, according to Anscombe, what he saw 
as good in it.  In this case, it would be that the Nazi felt it was his duty, as a Nazi, to kill Jewish 
children in his last hour.  However, if the Nazi simply said I’m a Nazi so I should kill Jewish 
children, it appears we could continue to ask why such a thing is the case until we do reach a 
base answer of something like, “It is my duty as a Nazi to do such a thing.”  At this point we 
would identify adhering to duty as the good he is appealing to, and we could make his actions 
intelligible.  However, to do this, we would still be appealing to some commonly shared view of 
what is good. 
 Another concern which arises when we require a desirability characterization for strong 
wants is that we can, according to Anscombe, dismiss some of the wants of others as not being 
real wants.  As Anscombe says, “When out of the blue someone says ‘I want a pin’ and denies 
wanting it for anything, let us suppose we give it to him and see what he does with it.  He takes 
it, let us say, he smiles and says ‘Thank you.  My want is gratified’- but what does he do with the 




To say ‘I merely want this’ without any characterisation is to deprive the word of sense” 
(Anscombe, 71).  While it does seem odd for someone to want something simply to have it, it 
seems even odder to follow Anscombe and say that someone is misguided about his own wants.  
Desire is typically viewed as a mental state, and it seems utterly misguided to tell someone that 
he is incorrect about his own mental state. We could perhaps tell him he shouldn’t want to have a 
pin because there is no sense in having a pin just to have it, but we surely wouldn’t tell him that 
he is wrong when he says he wants it.  Such a case would appear to be the same as a person 
saying, “I feel sick today,” and someone else trying to convince him that he actually doesn’t feel 
sick.  Anscombe has clearly tried to distance her view of wanting from the standard view of 
desire, but it still seems as though we would be mistaken in telling someone he is wrong about 
his own wants simply because we cannot see, or he cannot convey to us, what he sees as 
desirable in it.   
 Another problem with Anscombe’s view is that she mistakenly requires the person giving 
a desirability characterization to be able to explain what they see as good in their desire.  While it 
seems true that we generally do things because we see them as good, Setiya claims, “it is an 
unfortunate fact that we do not always act for good reasons.  We may not be aware of the 
considerations that count as reasons; we may be aware of them, and yet unmoved; and we may 
be moved to act by considerations that are not good reasons” (Setiya 346).  In these cases, the 
person acting may have reasons to act, but they may not see anything good in acting for which 
they can provide a desirability characterization.  This concern can play a role both in presenting 
desirability characterizations as well as utilizing practical reasoning to give reasons to act.  In 
either case, we may know that we do not have a good reason to do something, but we act 




For example, I may choose to call in sick to work one day because I would like to stay 
home and relax rather than going to work.  While I may desire to be home more than I desire to 
be at work, I would still be aware that going to work would be the more responsible and prudent 
thing to do while also recognizing that laziness was motivating my desire to stay at home.  In 
such a case, I would be aware that going to work would be the better choice of actions, but 
staying at home could still be more appealing.  I may even be aware that I will be disgusted with 
myself for shirking my responsibilities and choosing to yield to a desire which I recognize is not 
good.  In cases such as these, providing a desirability characterization seems problematic 
because it would appear my desire for staying home is motivated by a desire to not do what I 
recognize as good for me. If I were to provide an honest desirability characterization, it would be 
something like, “Staying home would be good for me because I’m feeling lazy, and I don’t feel 
like going to work today.”  While this characterization would certainly explain why I want to 
stay home, it wouldn’t show what good I see in staying home.  Rather, it would appeal to 
something I actually see as bad, laziness, as well as shirking my responsibility.  Thus, I could 
clearly desire to stay home while also recognizing that my desire to stay home is not a good 
desire for me to have.  This desire is perfectly coherent, and I have explained why I do not want 
to go to work, but I am still appealing to something, in this case laziness, which I do not see as 
good but which I still desire.  
5.  Summary of Problems 
Anscombe clearly believes she has created a coherent system of wanting in which strong 
wanting is something more than simple desire and can motivate intentional action, but her view 
is lacking in both coherence and completeness.  The most troubling component of her view is her 




considered moving towards is never adequately discussed.  Under a modified action-based view 
of wanting, the idea of moving toward could encompass a great deal of things, from simply 
having an intention to act to actual intentional action, but Anscombe is not clear about what her 
view requires it to be.  Further, it is not clear exactly what can constitute an object of strong 
wanting.  Anscombe initially seems rather precise when she requires that one must have 
knowledge that the wanted thing exists, but that stipulation decays into opinion that the wanted 
thing exists. However, as one can be of the opinion that anything at all can exist, this condition 
becomes rather meaningless.  This is especially apparent when we consider that Anscombe 
requires movement toward the wanted thing, but movement toward something which does not 
exist is not actually possible.  Even though Anscombe requires a desirability characterization to 
make one’s desire intelligible and the use of practical reasoning to give reasons why one should 
act, such conditions will not eliminate the problem.  After all, one can provide both even when 






 It has been my aim in this thesis to examine Anscombe’s position on weak and strong 
wanting both through examination of her own view and through the modifications she has made 
to ancient and modern views of desire.  I hope to have shown that Anscombe’s view, while 
useful in examining some ideas of action and intention, has too many unresolved flaws to make 
it a coherent system for explaining desire.  While there are certainly difficulties involved in her 
ideas of desirability characterizations and utilizing practical reasoning to produce action, the 
greatest faults lie in the basic tenets of the position.  
 For Anscombe’s view to be complete, her conditions concerning both knowledge and 
movement in relation to a strong want would need to be expanded and clarified.  To say that we 
must have knowledge of something for it to qualify as a possible strong want but to then 
diminish knowledge down to opinion, makes the bar for strong wanting barely distinct from that 
of weak wanting.  Further, the requirements for “movement toward” a strong want in 
Anscombe’s view are so vague that almost anything could count as movement.  Finally, 
Anscombe is never adequately clear on why the distinction between weak and strong wanting is 
necessary or helpful, nor how we can explain wanting independent from desire.  Were these 
problems to be resolved, Anscombe’s view may be somewhat strengthened, but some of the 
flaws are so deeply ingrained in the system that they may not be able to be adequately amended 
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